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THE LAW OF ADOPTION-A LEGAL
ANOMALY
Louis QUARLES*

We all know, if we stop to think, that the law of adoption in Wisconsin is purely statutory. Have we ever considered why this should
be the case, or whether it is in line with or out of line with the law on
this subject in the various countries of the world? An attempt is here
made to answer this question.
The fundamental law of the State of Wisconsin, aside from the
written constitutions of the United States and the State itself, is of
course taken from the common law of Great Britain. The procedure
and practice of our circuit courts: Wisconsin being a code state, is taken
from the State of New York. The probate practice of our county courts
does not stem from the common law but from the ecclesiastical law,
and the procedure there is taken from the State of Massachusetts. In
matters of adoption we have no heritage from either the common law,
the ecclesiastical law, nor from the civil law, but the matter is entirely
statutory. Our statutory procedure in turn was likewise borrowed from
Massachusetts.'
The history and development of the practice of adoption of children
is of extreme antiquity and great interest. In view of the antiquity and
universality of adoption throughout the world, it is extremely surprising to discover the anomalous situation in England and the United
States.
One of the best authorities we have on the practices and laws of
ancient peoples and societies is Sir Henry Maine's "Ancient Law." He
strips his analysis of primitive society of assumed theories of origin,
such as "social contract," etc., and analyzes the facts objectively. He
refers to the excellent description of the legal characteristics of mankind as found at the dawn of history in Homer's Odyssey:
"They have neither gathered for counsel nor oracles of law***
children and his wives, and they
and each one tells the law to his
' 2
pay no regard to one another.
*A.B.,

University of Michigan; senior partner of Lines, Spooner and Quarles,
Milwaukee, Wis.; Member of Wisconsin Bar.
'Hole v. Robbins, 53 Wis. 514, 521, 10 N.W. 617 (1881); Lacher v. Venus,

177 Wis. 558, 567, 188 N.W. 613 (1922).
Ancient Law, page 120. What has been rendered as "oracles of law"
is the Greek word Oqutrrn, "themistes." These are separately given, isolated, divinely inspired judgments, or "dooms." See ibid., pp. 3, 4, 7.

2 Maine,
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In trying to visualize the situation existing in primitive times, we
must firmly realize that society then was not what it is assumed to be
at present, to-wit: an aggregation of individuals, but was an aggregation of families. The unit for custom and juridical purposes was the
family, not the individual. The family was considered as a continuing
entity, one that never died. The patriarchal group was perpetual. If
one member of the family committed sin, his children and his fellow
citizens must suffer with him: the sin was that of the family. Evidences
of this are clearly discernible in the Biblical punishment of "visiting
the iniquity of the father upon the children, and upon the children's
children, upon the third and upon the fourth generation."3
The family, being the primordial and indistinguishable unit, was
formed of groups of citizens who claimed membership as founded on
common lineage, but wherever we look (with the notable exception of
Great Britain) we find the custom of admitting men of alien descent
into and amalgamating them with the family. This constant adulteration of the unit seems to have caused no surprise whatever but to have
been taken as a matter of course; in fact, as Sir Henry Maine says:
"1... what it really illustrates is the efficiency with which Legal
Fictions do their work in the infancy of society. The earliest
and most extensively employed of legal fictions was that which
permitted family relations to be created artificially, and there is
none to which I conceive mankind to be more deeply indebted.
If it had never existed, I do not see how any one of the primitive
groups, whatever were their nature, could have absorbed another,
or on what terms any two of them could have combined, except
those of absolute superiority on one side and absolute subjection
on the other. No doubt, when with our modern ideas we contemplate the union of independent communities, we can suggest
a hundred modes of carrying it out, the simplest of all being
that the individuals comprised in the coalescing groups shall vote
or act together according to local propinquity; but the idea that
a number of persons should exercise political rights in common
simply because they happened to live within the same topographical limits was utterly strange and monstrous to primitive antiquity. The expedient which in those times commanded favour
was that the incoming population should feign themselves to be
descended from the same stock as the people on whom they were
engrafted ;-4
If any historical proof were necessary of the correctness of the
maxim: "In fictione juris semper aequitas existit," it is found in the
history of adoption. The effectiveness of this fiction is further expressed by Maine:
"... We must look on the family as constantly enlarged by the
absorption of strangers within its circle, and we must try to re3Exodus 34:7.
4 Maine,

op. cit., pp. 125-6.
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gard the fiction of adoption as so closely simulating the reality of
kinship that neither law nor opinion makes the slightest difference between a real and an adoptive connection. On the other
hand, the persons theoretically amalgamated into a family by
their common descent are practically held together by common
obedience to their highest living ascendant, the father, grandfather, or great-grandfather. The patriarchal authority of a
chieftain is as necessary an ingredient in the notion of a family
group as the fact (or assumed fact) of its having sprung from
his loins."5
One of the civilizations that has retained its primitive customs
longer than most is that of the Hindus. With them the concept of wills
and of adoption were closely interwoven:
". . Among the Hindoos, the right to inherit a dead man's
property is exactly co-extensive with the duty of performing
his obsequies. If the rites are not properly performed or not
performed by the proper person, no relation is considered as
established between the deceased and anybody surviving him;
the Law of Succession does not apply, and nobody can inherit
the property. Every great event in the life of a Hindoo seems
to be regarded as leading up to and bearing upon these solemnities. If he marries, it is to have children who may celebrate
them after his death; if he has no children, he lives under the
strongest obligation to adopt them from another family, 'with a
view,' writes the Hindoo doctor, 'to the funeral cake, the water,
and the solemn sacrifice.' ,,
The same concept shows up in Japan. The Emperor is the direct
descendant of the sun and the male line is unbroken for thousands of
of years. You may ask: "How is this possible ?" The answer is simple:
"When there failed to be an heir one was adopted."
Adoption was practiced at a very early time among the Jews. We
find that an abandoned Jewish baby was adopted by Pharaoh's daughter
and named Moses.7 Also Esther was adopted by Mordecai."
Adoption was well known to the Greeks. Thus Aeschines has given

us an example where a man says:

viuv

rowotOat

7-va

-

"To adopt him

as as son." At Athens adoption could be accomplished either during
the lifetime of the adoptor or by his will. None but the independent
citizen of responsible character could be an adoptor and then only when
he was as yet without any male heirs.9 At first no special procedure
other than consent was required, but, as usual, the state ultimately
stepped in and regulations were made.
5Ibid., p. 128.
6 Ibid., p. 185.
78 Exodus 2:5-10.
Esther 2:5-8.
9Nettleship, Dictionary of Classical Antiquitses, "Adoption."
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"In Greece, in the interests of the next of kin whose rights were
affected by the case of adoption, it was provided that the registration should be attended with certain formalities, and that it
should take place at a fixed time, the festival of Thargelia."'10
The Romans practiced adoption very generally and very widely.
At Rome there were two kinds of adoption, but both required that the
adoptor be male and childless. The first was known as arrogatioand
applied where the person to be adopted was sui juris. In such cases
the adoption must be sanctioned by the comitia curiata. The second
form of adoption was adoption proper. That applied to those that were
still under the rule of the father, the patria potestas, and were thus
alieni juris, and was accomplished by the father going through the form
of selling his son by a formal mancipatio to the adoptor, which was
followed by the rendition of a judgment of adoption. As time passed
many other limitations developed; e.g., women could be adopted but
could not be arrogated. Neither could they adopt. 1 Finally codification took over.
"In Rome the system was in vogue long before the time of
Justinian, and the ceremonies to accomplish the result were cumbered with much formality, but he reduced the system to a code,
which simplified the proceedings. * * * The effect of adoption
was to cast the succession
on the adopted in case the adopting
2
father died intestate.'1
Probably the earliest record that we have of adoption, but which
emphasizes its extreme antiquity because even at that period (over 2000
B. C.), it had become codified, is Art. 185 of the Code of Hammurabi:
"If a man take a child in his name, adopt and rear him as a son, this
grown up son may not be demanded back."' 13
Turning our attention now to more modern times, there are two
European jurisdictions that provided for adoption and which have had
direct import on the law in parts of the United States. The first of
these is the French and the second the Spanish. The French is found
in the Code Napoleon, Art. 350, which provides in substance that inquiry must be made by a court, the adoptor must be of good reputation
and the act of adoption must be published and registered. Oddly enough
the adoptive parent must be fifty years of age and the adopted child
must be under twenty-one. 4
10

In re Session's Estate, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N.W. 249. "Thargelia" was the prin-

cipal feast of Apollo in Athens and was held on the seventh day of Thargelian (May or June). The celebrated birthday of the god was originally
connected with the ripening of field produce.
23 Nettleship, op. cit., "Adoption."
1In

re Session's Estate, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N.W. 249.

Davis, The Codes of Hanmnurabi and Moses, p. 82.
U Encyclopedi Britannica, "Adoption."

'1
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In Spain the proceedings were provided by Title 16 of the Spanish
Code, the "Siete Partidas." They were very similar to the French rules
as to procedure and specified that the person adopted succeeded as heir
to him who adopted him.-5
Adoption plays a most important part in German society and is regulated by a number of elaborate and carefully drawn code provisions,
and as in the case of France, provides for the action of a competent
court tribunal.,
Probably the most unusual provision is found in West Australia:
"Adoption is also provided for in the legislation of the British
dominions. In West Australia, for example, a male may be
adopted by a man 18 years his senior, or by a woman 30 years his
senior, or a female7 by a woman 18 years her senior or a man 30
years her senior."'
In view of the almost universal recognition of adoption throughout
the civilized world, and undoubtedly the uncivilized as well, it is passing strange that in Great Britain there should be a complete lacuna in
the common law. In fact, it was not until the passage of the British
Adoption of Children's Act in 1926 that a definite system of legal adoption was introduced to and put in force in Great Britain. The procedure
therein follows in general that of the Roman law."
This analysis has already been extended to unwarranted lengths.
One should not attempt to pile Pelion on Ossa. Hence to the moral
that adorns the tale. The United States, as we all know, adopted the
common law of Great Britain in force at the time of separation from
the mother country in 1776. No provision being found therein for
adoption, we have no common law on the subject in those states of the
United States which, like Wisconsin, base their jurisprudence on the
British common law. There are, however, two states - and two only
- which do have provisions for adoption as part of their legal inheritance, to-wit: Louisiana, which follows the French civil law, and Texas
a former country which was united to us by treaty - which follows
the Spanish law. In all the rest of the states the matter is purely statutory. Clearly so in Wisconsin !'
There was no general provision for adoption in Wisconsin prior to
1858 and up to that time no one could legally adopt a child, except
through the enactment of a private law. The earliest public statute on
adoption in Wisconsin is Chapter XLIX, R. S. 1858; now Chapter 322
of the Statutes.
15 Vidal v. Cotnntag~re, 13 La. Ann. 516, 518; Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo 456,
98 S.W. 585, 8 L.R.A. (ns) 117 (1906).
16 Enc. Brit., tit. "Adoption."
17Ibid.
Is Ibid. "2 Poll. & Mait. 399. Charles Dickens, a great legal historian, in Chapter
IX of Our Mutual Friends, says: 'The Buffins adopted Bella Wilfer.' He
refers to no legal procedure, and it seems to be completely extra-judicial."
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The constitutionality of our adoption statute has even been challenged. Our Supreme Court has held that a statute changing the line
of descent of property from the natural to the adoptive parents was
20
constitutional.
The absence of any common law background means that the statutes
must be strictly construed or the proceedings fail. There is no give and
take, for, as Mr. Justice Holmes once said: "We must turn square
corners." Thus it has been held that failure strictly to comply with the
statute cannot be cured by the application of principles of equity:
"In order to constitute one an adopted son of another there must
be judicial proceedings to that end conformably to the statute.
Equity has no power to declare an adoption. The common law
was and is a stranger to adoption proceedings * * *."
"It is admitted by the trial court and the respondent that the law
relative to adoption has not been complied with, but it is sought
to cure the defect by the application of an equitable principle.
* * * But we have only one way of making an adoption, and that
is to follow the statute. Clear mandatory statutory proceedings
do not permit of equitable repeal." 21
The statute providing that the child shall inherit from its adoptive
parents has been strictly construed under the doctrine of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius so as not to include inheritance by the child
22

from the parent's kindred.

An illustration of the harsh effects of the application of the doctrine
is seen in a case arising because of the statutory mandate which provides that the petition for adoption be made by the husband and wife.
In this case the wife was an incompetent and it was held that the adoption was void.m Similarly, in a case where an order of adoption was
made on the petition of a man who was in fact married but which fact
was not disclosed. When it later appeared in connection with the devolution of title to property that he had been married at the time, the
order of adoption was held to be invalid and without jurisdiction 2 4
The statute is all-inclusive. For example, it has been held that adoptive parents can no more surrender rights in or modify the status of a
child by contract than can natural parents under similar conditions. 25
Although the statute controls as to intestate succession it does not
necessarily do so as to testate succession. Thus, the question arose in
construing a will leaving a life estate to a granddaughter and remain19

Hole v. Robbins, 53 Wis. 514, 521, 10 N.W. 617 (1881) ; Lacher v. Venus, 177
Wis. 558, 567, 188 N.W. 613 (1922).

20JIn

re Hood's Will, 206 Wis. 227, 239 N.W. 448 (1931).

2 St. Vincent's Infant Asylum v. Central Wisconsin Trust Co., 189 Wis. 483,

206 N.W. 921 (1926).
re Bradley's Estate, 185 Wis. 393, 201 N.W. 973, 38 A.L.R. 1 (1925).
Adoption of Bearby, 185 Wis. 33, 200 N.W. 686 (1924).
24
22 In

23

In re Bresnehan's Will, 221 Wis. 51, 265 N.W. 93 (1936).

25

Stickels v. Reichardt, 203 Wis. 579, 234 N.W. 728 (1931).
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der to her children and descendants of such. The granddaughter had
no heirs of the body but did have one adopted daughter, adopted long
after the decease of the testator. Held that the question was not the
power of the adopted child to inherit but one of fact, i.e., could the
testator have been expected to contemplate an act of adoption by the life
tenant - in this case not 2 6 Ergo, if adoption by a beneficiary is contemplated, or adopted children are to be included, that probability or
fact should be provided for in the will.
Probably the extreme case illustrating the strictness of the rule is
found where the curative act of 1929 was under construction. In that
instance the adoption proceeding concededly failed to comply with the
jurisdictional provisions, but was claimed to be validated by the curative act subsequently passed by the legislature. Our court held that no
subsequent legislation could constitutionally cure the original want of
27
jurisdiction and the whole proceedings were invalid and void.
Enough has been said to demonstrate the anomalous situation of
our law of adoption, a law which has no direct background or roots in
custom or history. The result here, as is the case in the adoption of
codes, is to fix a body of law that cannot develop spontaneously. Development must come from without. So far as the courts are concerned, construction of words takes the place of resort to justice and
equity. Semantics are substituted for reason. The results are often
harsh and unfortunate.
Being purely statutory procedure, the Wisconsin cases point up
forcibly the absolute necessity of adherence to the letter of the law, for
that is all that there is to follow. There is no opportunity to resort to
custom or history, or spirit. Of such it cannot be said: "Not of the
letter, but of the spirit, for the letter killeth but the spirit giveth life."28
The failure to strictly adhere may result in the breaking up of a
family by the sudden removal of a child that has been reared from
infancy by adoptive parents, or, again, many years later may invalidate
the descent of real or personal property. Is it not passing strange that
the two greatest English speaking countries should have been so long
out of step with the rest of the world in such an important and fundamental matter, and with such unfortunate results?

26
2T

Lichter v. Thiers, 139 Wis. 481, 121 N.W. 153 (1909).
Will of Bresnehan, 221

282 Cor. 3:6.

Wis. 51, 265 N.W. 93 (1936).

